This paper provides theoretical and empirical explanations for reversals in international market integration. I argue that even after fully lifting the barriers to investment, markets could be segmented conditional on funding liquidity drought. Extending Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) model, I present an international-margin CAPM where investors face both investor-specific and asset-specific margin constraints. Under the null of no segmentation, the model dictates that local shadow prices of the margin constraints comove globally. As a result, I construct a measure of equity market segmentation based on value-weighted differentials of these shadow prices. This newly introduced measure confirms previously documented evidence concerning market integration dynamics. More interestingly, it negatively comoves with local funding liquidity measures, indicating that most reversals occur during funding distress periods. * I am indebted to Francesca Carrieri, Aytek Malkhozov, and PhD thesis committee for their patient supervision and continuous support during my PhD. I am also grateful to
Introduction
The literature of international finance has intensively studied global market integration and its dynamics through time. It has been documented that markets are becoming more integrated due to the progressive reduction of barriers to international investment and regulatory restrictions. However, at times we also have observed reversals, for which the literature has failed to provide convincing explanations. This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence that partly explains these reversals via the role of financial intermediaries and funding liquidity.
Market integration is a central concept in international finance mainly because it is a critical factor for international diversification benefits, more than other measures such as cross-market correlations. For instance, if international investment opportunities can be fully replicated at home, then low cross-market correlation does not necessarily imply the existence of diversification opportunities for domestic investors, whereas low values of market integration is a more informative indicator of diversification opportunity (see Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (1999) , Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) ). Moreover, understanding market integration also sheds lights on the contagion mechanism across markets via investment or shared discount factor channel. One strand of the literature argues that by force of arbitrage local credit shocks in a market, for instance the US, could be transmitted across the global markets via the SDF channel (Dedola and Lombardo (2012) ). However, if markets become segmented during these periods, then international assets are not governed by one common pricing kernel, hence shared SDF cannot be a valid contagion channel.
As a result of its important role in asset pricing, the literature of international finance has explored different dimensions and implications of market integration.
1 Research shows that markets differ in their degree of integration, and these cross-sectional differences are justified by the severity of the barriers to international investment in each market. 2 Moreover, research documents that market integration is a time-varying process with an upward trend and few reversals. This upward trend is linked to progressive reduction of explicit and implicit barriers of investment. However, persistent reduction of these barriers stands at odds with occurrence of reversals. Analysis of graphs of measures of market integration in this literature confirms that the reversals mainly occur during global financial crises (see Figure 1 ). Yet, to my knowledge, no paper has directly explained these patterns and there is no study on the dynamics of market integration conditional on financial crises. In fact, the mechanisms and channels that affect market segmenation during crises periods have not been fully explored, especially in the post-liberalization period, when most barriers to investment have been lifted. Moreover, the role of institutional investors, who are responsible for most cross-country investments, has not been clearly defined in this process.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
Bekaert et al. (2011) point out that market segmentation increases in recessions and
periods of market stress and relate it to increase in global risk aversion in these periods.
However, since their market segmentation measure is "model-free," they cannot provide the exact mechanism and explanation for these increases in segmentation. Drawing analogy to the domestic setting, I conjecture that the frictions in borrowing market can provide a potential explanation for the occurrence of reversals during financial crisis. If we take the TED spread as a proxy of funding conditions for global investors, Figure 1 shows that all reversals, except one case, are contemporaneous with worsening of funding conditions.
In domestic settings, the literature of limits to arbitrage provides theoretical and empirical evidence that funding illiquidity and frictions in markets could result in deviations from the Law of One Price. 3 This matches the definition of segmented markets, where similar assets with identical cash flows could be priced differently across international markets (Chen and Knez (1995) ). For instance, a financially constrained arbitrageur, as the liquidity provider in two isolated markets, would fail to trade simultaneously in the two markets and close the price gap of similar assets during crises periods Vayanos (2002, 2010) ).
Empirical research on the dynamics of the home bias also suggests a potential link to market segmentation, documenting that the home bias of institutional investors increases following funding shocks. 4 When funding liquidity is scarce, investors, unable to execute their international trading strategies, "fly to home," as if local funding illiquidity were to represent as a barrier to international investment. The inability to share occasional local funding liquidity risk internationally translates to more risk that should be borne by local investors. Thus, market segmentation would increase during funding distress. Related to this phenomenon, Warnock and Warnock (2009) show that foreign inflows into the U.S.
Government Bonds drop following the 1987 Black Monday, 1998 LTCM default, East Asia crashes, and tech-bubble burst in 2001.
The literature of intermediary asset pricing studies the frictions faced by institutional investors, such as agency problems and leverage constraints, to explain asset price comovements. These intermediaries are responsible for most cross-country investments and when the frictions they face increase, international prices might be consequently affected. Inability to borrow, as in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) , is one of these frictions that have attracted growing attention of researchers, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show financially constrained investors, who cannot buy on margin, overweight high-beta securities to lever up their portfolios. This consequently reduces the premium of these securities, because of their efficiency as liquidity providers.
3 Influential research in this literature includes Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Basak and Croitoru (2000) , Gromb and Vayanos (2002) , Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Duffie (2010) , Geanakoplos (2010) , Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) , Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) , Adrian and Shin (2014) .
4 See for example Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012) , Giannetti and Laeven (2012) , and Ahrend and Schwellnus (2013) The authors show that a beta-neutral portfolio that longs the low-beta portfolio and shorts the high-beta portfolio has a positive premium, which is increasing in the ex-ante tightness of constraints. They call this portfolio the Betting Against Beta or BAB.
Extending their paper, in order to study the impact of borrowing frictions on global market integration and explore the role of institutional investors, I propose a simple asset pricing framework that incorporates both heterogeneity among securities, and among investors.
5 These assumptions are supported by research and practice. Ceteris paribus, it is more difficult to borrow against highly volatile stocks from emerging markets, as they require higher margins, comparing to large stable stocks from developed markets. Comparing to retail investors, institutional investors are less financially constrained and are able to lever up their portfolios more easily. In fact, research has shown that more volatile assets require higher margins (see Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) and the references therein) because of the devaluation risk of the underlying. For instance, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
Group's approach is to adjust margin requirements based on historical, intraday, and implied volatilities (see Figure 2 ). 6 Since, emerging markets have persistently higher volatilities than developed markets, it is expected to observe heterogeneity of margin requirements among international assets. 7 In a similar setting, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) also study assetspecific margins and show that high-margin assets have higher expected returns, especially during funding liquidity droughts.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
I empirically show that the shadow price of margin constraints in this framework comove less in periods of funding illiquidity across markets. That is, in these periods there is no global representative investor and we have different margin constraints for different markets, 5 For different applications this setting has been studied in Chen and Lu (2014) and Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2014) 6 Reference: www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/cme-clearing-margins-quick-facts-2011.pdf 7 From personal discussions with portfolio managers of institutional investors, they confirm that in practice margins are also set based on location of assets, due to differences in perceived foreign investment risk of securities, such as political or corruption risk. In domestic market, Gorton and Metrick (2010) provide evidence on time variation and cross-sectional differences of Repo Haircuts backed by different securities.
hence market segmentation increases. On the other hand, during periods of less market stress, when capital flows freely, these shadow prices comove more strongly across markets, as if all investors are constrained by one aggregated margin constraint, hence market integration increases. Interestingly, the correlations of shadow prices of funding constraints are higher for developed markets, comparing to emerging markets, consistent with the previously documented empirical evidence. In addition, I show that there is an upward trend in these correlations, consistent with the effect of market liberalizations on global market integration.
The effect of funding liquidity on capital mobility is different from asset liquidity, although the two are linked via liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) ). Many authors have pointed out to the role of liquidity risk in international investments and have shown liquidity risk as a priced local factor may lead to valuation differentials (see Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) and references therein). However, in fully integrated markets without investment barriers, local liquidity factors will aggregate out as a global liquidity factor and local liquidity factor is not priced. On the other hand, margin constraints may lead to local funding liquidity shocks, which persist in international markets even after full market liberalization.
The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature of global market integration and limits to arbitrage. In section 3, I introduce the model and the measure of market segmentation. Moreover, in this section I elaborate theoretically how funding liquidity segments the markets. Dataset and the empirical methodology, as well as the result, are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the implications of the model and concludes.
Related Literature
In this section I review the main ideas of market integration introduced in international finance and limits to arbitrage literatures. Integrated market is defined as an economy where all assets, irrespective of their origin, are priced by a unique (common) pricing kernel. In other words, in this economy similar assets have identical prices across markets. Conversely, in segmented market there exists a different pricing kernel for each market; that is, local asset pricing factors, as opposed to global factors, price local assets, consequently, prices of similar assets may diverge. As markets become more integrated, the investment opportunity set expands for investors across markets and the cost of capital drops. In addition, integration enables the investors to better hedge the idiosyncratic risk of their holdings by reducing the local impact of countryspecific shocks. The international finance literature has introduced numerous measures that quantify market integration and has proposed factors that can explain the dynamics of market integration through time. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) study the evolution of market integration induced by a single factor model (CAPM) within regime-switching framework. In their setting, measure of market integration is the time-varying probability that markets conform to one of the two polar extreme cases of full integration (i.e. when the pricing kernel is the global CAPM) and complete segmentation (i.e. when the pricing kernels are the local CAPM). Carrieri et al.
(2007) introduce a measure of market integration based on the amount of risk explained by integrated model relative to segmented model. There, the polar cases of full integration and segmentation are modeled in the sprite of Errunza and Losq (1985) that takes into account infeasible assets. Focusing on an APT asset pricing model, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) introduce a measure of market integration based on the proportion of a country's returns that can be explained by global factors. More specifically, they take the R-squared of the regression of a country's market index returns on common global factors, which are extracted from principal components analysis. Similar to the other papers, they document that integration is increasing, possibly as a result of the reduction in the barriers. But more interestingly, they report higher global market integration in bear markets; however, they do not bring economic justifications for this pattern. Bekaert et al. (2011) introduce a measure of market segmentation based on price-earning ratio differentials of industry portfolios across market. They argue that industry portfolios have similar growth opportunities and similar systematic risk across markets, thus their PE ratios should be similar, under the null of no segmentation. Bekaert et al. (2011) point out that market segmentation increases in recessions and periods of market stress and relate it to increase in global risk aversion in these periods. However, since their market segmentation measure is "model-free," they cannot provide the exact mechanism or convincing explanation for increase in segmentation during those periods.
It is important to point out that the market index cross-correlation is a flawed measure of market integration. That is, higher correlations do not necessarily translate to more market integration and more integration does not necessarily lead to higher correlations.
Formally, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) show that unless the underlying asset pricing model is a single-factor model, there is no link between market integration and market-wide correlations. Assets in perfectly integrated markets may exhibit low cross-correlation, if they have different loadings on the pricing factors. Moreover, correlations might increase simply because of increasing common factor variance, rather than increasing exposures to common factors (Forbes and Rigobon (2002) ). In other words, market returns may exhibit common patterns simply because markets are increasingly hit by the similar shocks. Alternative argument against this link is provided via homemade diversification ( Errunza et al. (1999) , Carrieri et al. (2007) ). Lastly, higher integration should yield less contagion due to higher risk sharing where we observe the opposite in these periods (Forbes (2012) ).
The literature has also introduced explanatory variables that can explain time-series and cross-section of market segmentation across countries. These variables are mainly categorized as explicit or implicit barriers to investment. Explicit barriers are regulatory restrictions on capital movement and are measured by variables such as equity market openness, capital account openness and trade openness. These regulatory barriers that directly impede international investment are shown to be the most important explanatory variable of market segmentation. Implicit barriers to investment include a wide range of variables such as institutional environment, quality of information available to investors, corporate governance, political risk and legal environment. The recent market liberalizations and globalization trend suggest a progressive reduction of barriers to international investment and fail to explain reversals. However, the empirical proxies of these barriers may be imperfect and imply reversals. For instance, the literature uses ratio of equity market capitalization to gross domestic product as a proxy for financial development and institutions environment. This is supported by the observation that financially developed countries have higher equity market capitalization to GDP ratios. However, any drop in this ratio does not necessarily imply a decrease in institutional developments in the countries. More plausibly in higher frequencies, this drop can be attributed more to the frictions in financial markets and less to the real economy and institutions' development.
The literature of limits to arbitrage study deviations from the law of one price (LoOP) through the role of the arbitrageurs (see Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for detail literature review). This literature has documented how assets with claims to almost identical dividend streams (e.g. "Siamese-twin" stocks) can be traded at significantly different prices. The basic justification for this phenomenon is that these stocks are exposed to different risk factors, thus they have different prices. From this point of view, deviation of LoOP matches the market segmentation definition (Chen and Knez (1995) ). In this strand of literature, deviations from LoOP are explained through the costs and constraints that arbitrageurs face. Gromb and Vayanos (2010) emphasize the following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (i) risk, both fundamental and non-fundamental, (ii) costs of short-selling, (iii) leverage and margin constraints, and (iv) constraints on equity capital. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, leverage and margin constraints have attracted a growing attention both among researchers and among policy makers. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) study liquidity spirals, the link between investors funding liquidity and asset's market liquidity. Geanakoplos (2010) studies an equilibrium where variations in leverage cause fluctuations in asset prices. Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) show that required returns of securities increase in their margin requirements. Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) study the agency problem between retail investors and financial intermediaries, and point out to the role of the wealth of these intermediaries in determining asset prices. Similarly, Adrian and Shin (2014) study this agency problem from the leverage constraints. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) explore the explanatory power of the leverage of financial intermediaries in explaining the cross-section of asset returns. Empirically they show a single-factor model based on shocks to broker-dealers' leverage outperforms standard multi-factor benchmarks in pricing the cross-section of size, book-to-market, momentum, and bond portfolios. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) ) consider mean-variance investors with different borrowing ability and show that investors, who cannot buy on margin, overweight high-beta securities in their portfolios for their embedded margin, comparing to CAPM prediction. This extra demand pressure drives the premium of these securities down, which results in a flatter capital market line. Therefore, betting against beta portfolio with zero market beta would have positive premium. Here, an investor holds a portfolio of low-beta assets, levering them up to beta of one, and shorts high-beta assets, levering them down to beta one.
In this paper, I extend Frazzini and Pedersen's framework to a more general setting where investors also face asset-specific margins in an international setting. For different applications, asset-specific and investor-specific margin constraints have been previously introduced and studied in the literature. For instance, Chen and Lu (2014) construct a market-based measure of funding constraint extracted from different classification of stocks and show this measure helps explain the cross-section of hedge fund returns. The intuition, similar to Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) , is that the constrained investors are willing to pay a higher price for stocks with embedded leverage and this effect is stronger for stocks with higher margin requirements. Malkhozov et al. (2014) introduce an international liquidity asset pricing model and construct a measure of funding liquidity based on fixed income market data for six developed market, in the spirit of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) . Empirically, they show funding liquidity has strong pricing implications on cross-section of international stock.
Model
In this section, I describe the model setting and introduce the measure of international market segmentation.
Extending Frazzini and Pedersen's framework, I consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) economy with I (i = 1, . . . , I) mean-variance optimizer agents in K (k = 1, . . . , K) countries and J (j = 1, . . . , J) risky securities. In each period t, agents are born with wealth W i,t ≥ 0, and they invest internationally subject to their margin constraints. In the next period, t + 1, agents consume and exit the economy. The risky securities are in total supply of θ j t , and each pay real dividends D j t in the unique consumption good in period t. Their ex-dividend price is denoted by P j t . Investors maximize their utility by choosing a portfolio of risky assets and investing the rest of their wealth at the risk-free rate r f . In matrix notation, each investor maximizes:
where
is the vector of portfolio choice of investor i and includes the number of shares she invests in each asset. γ i denotes the agent i's coefficient of risk aversion
and Ω is the covariance matrix of asset prices. Investors are margin constrained, that is they must finance a fraction of their investment, m j i,t , by their own capital and cannot fully borrow.
The constraint requires that sum of the total dollar (investor-specific and asset-specific) margins invested by agent i to be less than her wealth. In Black ( (1985) . This paper focuses on the post-liberalization period, where traditional barriers to investment (explicit or implicit) are fully lifted, and introduces funding illiquidity as barrier to investment.
Under these assumptions and under the null of no segmentation, I derive the following international-margin CAPM:
Here, the betas are with respect to the global market return, and the risk premium, λ t , is for the global market risk. ψ t is the shadow price of the funding constraint of the representative investor and m G t is the aggregated margin required for the global market portfolio.
If margin constraints are not binding, i.e. when ψ t = 0, then the model reverts to the basic single-factor CAPM. However, assuming investors are financially constrained, assets that require higher margins, relative to the average asset, command extra premiums.
we have segmented markets:
funding liquidity enters in the pricing kernel. Whereas, in a segmented world, capital cannot move freely and local funding liquidities persist. Hence, shadow prices of funding constraint may diverge. Therefore, any discrepancies between the estimated ψ k t across markets imply that investors face market-specific frictions that cannot be diversified out; hence it would be interpreted as a measure of market segmentation.
Empirical Results
In this section, I introduce the identification methodology and the dataset. The empirical results are then presented.
Methodology
I follow Frazzini and Pedersen's methodology in estimating BAB portfolio. For this purpose, I compute market beta of each asset by estimating volatilities and correlations separately with rolling-window estimations, which permits to overcome non-synchronous trading. Beta of asset j at each period is computed by the correlation of this asset's return and the global market portfolio's, in the last five years, multiplied by the ratio of asset volatility to market volatility, in the last year. 12 Then betas are shrunk toward the cross-sectional mean to reduce the influence of outliers. For volatility estimation, I use one-day log returns and use overlapping three-day log returns for correlation estimation to control for nonsynchronous trading.
To form the BAB portfolio, at each period t and in each country k, all assets are ranked based on their betas and are grouped in two categories (high-and low-beta). In each group, securities are weighted by the beta ranks in that group. BAB portfolio is then formed by longing the low-beta portfolio, leveraged to beta one, and shorting the high-beta portfolio,
de-leveraged to a beta of one:
Hence, Equation (5) enables us to extract funding liquidity of the global representative investors from securities in market k, controlling for both the beta spread and margins.
Assuming country-specific margins are well approximated by market volatility, m k t = a + bσ k,t−1 , we can rewrite Equation (5) as below:
where, Z k t is the product of local beta spread,
and local market realized volatility. Since funding liquidity is a persistent variable, we can estimate it with rollingwindow estimation or latent variable methods.
13 In this paper, I exploit the latter method and implement Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Gibbs Sampling because it permits to mark the variations to business dates.
Here, I assume ψ t follows a stationary AR(1) process with mean reversion and estimate φ 0 , φ 1 , σ ψ , σ b with MCMC and Gibbs Sampler with normal distributions for priors of the unknowns. Prior for φ 1 is a truncated normal between (-1,1) to ensure stationarity. By
Bayes law, posterior distributions are proportional to the priors times the likelihoods, which are defined by Equation (7). Then, I randomly draw 10,000 samples from the posteriors and 13 In a similar setting, for estimating conditional market beta for single-factor CAPM, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) implement rolling window estimation and Jostova and Philipov (2005) and Ang and Chen (2007) implement latent variable estimation.
14 Rolling-window estimation results in similar dynamic for ψ t , however, the estimates only speak for the average funding liquidity over the window. Results are available from the author upon request.
take the average to estimate the mean of the parameters. The first 1,000 draws are excluded as they are considered the training set. Detail of the estimation is in the Appendix.
Under the null of no segmentation, the estimates of ψ t from each market should comove perfectly. On the other hand, in a segmented world these estimates diverge from each other.
Thus, I estimate value-weighted discrepancies among ψ t pairs to construct a measure of market segmentation.
where, w k t is the weight of country k in the world market portfolio. The exclusion of these stocks is done manually by examining the names of the individual stocks, as neither DataStream nor WorldScope provide codes for discerning non-common shares from common shares. I drop stocks with names including "REIT," "REAL EST," "GDR," "PF," "PREF," or "PRF" as these terms may represent REITs, Global DRs, or preferred stocks. We drop stocks with names including "ADS,"
Data
To limit the effect of survivorship bias, the dead stocks are also included in the sample. 
Results
In this section, first, I provide summary statistics of the BAB portfolios across markets, then I introduce the measure of market segmentation based on these portfolios, and lastly I show this measure comove with funding difficulty in each market. This evidence supports the claim that funding illiquidity can be an effective barrier to investment, and worsening of local funding conditions can possibly explain reversals in market integration.
4.3.1 BAB Analysis. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the countries in the dataset and the BAB portfolio returns. In our sample, developed markets on average, have considerably more firms in the cross-section comparing to emerging markets, and have lower market volatilities, as measured by the monthly realized squared market returns. Lower cross-section of assets results in larger beta spread for emerging markets. In addition, the beta spread across developed markets fall in the vicinity of 0.60, whereas for emerging market the beta spreads fall in a large range, from 0.24 to 1.44. The table also presents average of "RESPT," "UNIT," "TST," "TRUST," "INCOME FD," "INCOME FUND," "UTS," "RST," "CAP.SHS," "INV," "HDG," "SBVTG," "VTG.SAS," "GW.FD," "RTN.INC," "VCT," "ORTF," "HI.YIELD," "PART-NER," "HIGH INCOME," "INC.&GROWTH," and "INC.&GW" due to various special features.
BAB returns, as well as their correlations with the BAB return in the US. Consistent with findings of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) in almost all countries the premium for the betting against beta is positive. We observe that the correlations of BAB returns of developed market with the BAB in the US are higher than the correlations in emerging markets. Since market volatility (as a measure of margins) and beta spread in developed markets are similar to those of the US market, Equation (5) implies that high correlations of BABs translate to higher comovements of ψ k t , which is consistent with the previously documented evidence that developed markets are more integrated to the US market.
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Analysis of the shadow prices of the funding constraints supports the results of Table 1 .
Controlling for the heterogeneity in the margins and beta spread, I estimate the ψ This is consistent with the null of integration that in these markets capital mobility is higher and local funding liquidity diversifies out by global influx of capital.
[Place Figure 3 about here] 4.3.2 Measure of Market Segmentation. The results in Figure 3 and Table 1 are also supported by the analysis of the newly introduced measure of market segmentation. Under the null of no segmentation, international-margin CAPM dictates that the shadow price of the global representative investor extracted from any zero beta portfolio should be the same. Therefore, the discrepancies between these extracted prices of any pair of markets, c and k, imply the severity of the barriers to capital flow across the two markets. Thus, the distance between these prices and can be interpreted as the degree of market segmentation of market c from k and vice versa. Analogously, a value-weighted average of the discrepancies between market c and all other markets in the world can be interpreted as measure of market segmentation for country c. If markets are integrated, local funding illiquidity diversifies out by global capital mobility.
However, in segmented markets local funding illiquidity persists, which indicates existence of barriers to investment. If markets become more segmented during funding liquidity droughts, then the funding liquidity can be interpreted as a barrier to investment. Table 3 studies this hypothesis in three cases, all markets, developed markets and emerging markets in a panel regression. The table presents test results on the measure of market segmentation conditional on local funding liquidity in three unbalanced pool panel regressions. In the first panel, we pool all measure of market segmentation of markets, in the second case, we only pool developed markets and in the last case, we pool only the emerging markets. Standard errors are clustered through both time and cross-section. Adjusted R-square and sample size in each panel is also reported. In all cases, the measure of market segmentation positively and statistically comoves with local funding illiquidity. That is, market segmentation is higher in periods when investors are more financially constraints and it is smaller in periods when investors face less difficulty obtaining required funding. If investors liquidate their international investments during local funding shocks, eventually capital mobility decreases and assets in local market are priced by local demand, which leads to local pricing factors in the pricing kernel, hence markets become segmented.
[Place Table 3 about here]
I acknowledge the error-in-the-variable bias in this analysis, resulted in estimating the local funding liquidity time-series. To confirm that the main result of this paper is not driven by this bias, I focus on the US market. The choice of the U.S. market is justified by the large population of active international institutional investors residing in the U.S. market and data availability necessary to construct multiple measures of funding liquidity. Potential proxies introduced by the literature are the TED spread, the VIX index, Credit spread, broker dealer leverage. The TED spread, by construction, is the difference between collateral and un-collateral borrowing rates and captures the tightness of funding constraint ). The TED spread is available at daily frequency since 1986. For monthly analysis, I take its last observation of the month. The broker dealer leverage, as promoted by , is the total wealth of financial intermediaries divided by their total debt and indicates the financial difficulty the intermediaries face for funding their daily trades. This variable is available at quarterly frequency since 1970, therefore in the analysis I take the measure of segmentation at the last observation of the quarter to synchronize the RHS and the LHS. The VIX index and Credit spread are not theoretically linked to the funding liquidity, however, they are considered informative of the state of the credit markets. The VIX index is available at daily frequency since 1990. For monthly analysis and I take its last observation of the month. The credit spread is available at monthly frequency since 1920. Table 4 presents the result of US segmentation test conditional on funding liquidity in the US market. Results show all variables are estimated positive at monthly frequency, consistent with the hypothesis that the local funding liquidity in the US market segments this market from the rest of the world. The TED spread and the funding liquidity of the local representative investor, implied by the margin-CAPM, Ψ k t , are statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels. Only broker dealer leverage is estimated negative, for which we fail to reject the null even at 10% significance level.
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I further extend this analysis with quantile regressions in Table 5 Table 4 . When funding liquidity dries out, as in the case of Panel A, US segmentation increases. Conversely, as funding constraints relaxes for investors US segmentation decreases. Here, the intuition is that the local funding illiquidity restricts capital mobility and it effectively acts as a barrier to international investment, thus, it results in market segmentation.
[Place Table 5 about here] 4.3.4 Global Institutional Investors and Market Segmentation. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show that when financial intermediaries, as the liquidity providers, are financially constraints, deviation from LoOP occurs, as intermediaries cannot close the gap between similar assets across markets. In their setting, barriers to investment prohibits the domestic investors to invest abroad, however, the financial intermediary has access to both markets.
As a result, if local prices diverge from their intrinsic value, the intermediary simultaneously bids in the two market to arbitrage out the price mismatch. This ensures that price of assets are governed by aggregate demand and supply of the two markets, as oppose to local demands and supplies. However, if the intermediary is financially constrained and fails to deposit sufficient margins required to execute the two trades, deviation from LoOP is possible. We test this hypothesis on our measure of market segmentation. Consistent with the assumptions of Gromb and Vayanos's model, research has shown that global institutional investors are responsible for most cross-country investments. Since these investors mostly rely on the US market for their borrowing activities, it is plausible to assume US funding liquidity highly affects these investors' ability to borrow. Table 6 present the results of a pool panel regression. All proxies of the funding liquidity for the global institutional investors are positively correlated with market segmentation except the credit spread, for which we fail to reject the null at 10% significant level.
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Because of the relative size of the US market, its funding liquidity can also affect strongly global funding liquidity. Since during global funding drought local investors liquidate their foreign investments, in these periods more local risk is borne by local investors, which translates to local pricing factors, hence, market segmentation increases conditional on US funding liquidity shocks. The critical point here is that the "flight to home" is essentially different from "flight to quality" phenomena, where risky securities become especially illiquid during market downturns (Giannetti and Laeven (2012) ). Effect of the global funding liquidity on local funding liquidities should be stronger for more integrated markets, such as developed markets. Table 7 test this hypothesis, where I separately study the effect of global funding liquidity on developed markets and emerging markets in pooled panel regression. Consistent with the International-margin CAPM in almost all cases segmentation increases following funding liquidity shocks. Interestingly, this effect is stronger for developed market, at least statistically.
[Place Table 7 about here]
Conclusion and Discussion
The analysis in this paper provides further evidence against early research on market integration that relates it to market-wide correlations. Empirical research presents ample evidence that cross-correlations of market index returns increase after large systematic shocks (Longin and Solnik (2001)). Therefore, based on the arguments of early research on market integration, one should expect that market integration increase, not decrease, after large international crashes. As Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) reports, most financial intermediaries are net long in the market. Therefore, capital constraints are more likely to be hit during market downturns and to force these investors to "fly to home," which leads to inefficient international risk sharing and market segmentation. Previous research also provides convincing arguments against the link between correlations and integration, some of which are reviewed in the Section 2.
The argument of this paper is also in line with the previously documented empirical evidence of the importance of implicit barriers (see Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza (2013) ). In this literature the ratio of market capitalization to GDP and ratio of private credit to GDP, as proxies of financial development and banking development of markets, positively correlates with market integration. The underlying argument is that countries with larger market capitalization or larger credit markets are more financially developed and they have higher quality financial institutions. These variables could explain the cross-sectional deferences among countries; however, they do not necessarily represent changes in quality of institutions and financial developments in high frequencies, especially during market downturns. During these periods, short term funding liquidity shocks in the asset market, most likely do not affect the real economy and GDP. However, these shocks affect asset market capitalization, liquidity and credit markets in the same direction as the argument of this paper. I argue these variables partly proxy the local funding liquidity shocks during the stress periods and from this channel affect market integration. This paper also shed more light on the contagion mechanisms during financial crisis (see Forbes (2012) for detailed categorization of contagion channels) and brings evidence against contagion explanations that are based on market integration assumption. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, investment and portfolio channel (Kyle and Xiong (2001) ) has gained considerable attentions as credible contagion channels. In this regard, some researchers argue that the international exposure of highly leveraged financial intermediaries to subprimerelated assets in the U.S. was the central contagion channel in that period. Intermediaries that were affected by the downturn in the subprime market, to repair their balance sheet were forced to liquidate other assets, which further contracted lending and investment across the board, and further deepened the financial crisis (Krugman (2008) ). However, Dedola and Lombardo (2012) argue that the high degree of home bias in international financial markets suggests that the cross-border propagation via balance sheet effects would be relatively small.
In response, they propose a contagion channel, where borrowing costs are synchronized across markets by force of no arbitrage, in an integrated markets framework with investors that are restricted to borrow locally. Optimality of investors' decisions and portfolio choices require that the returns on domestic and foreign capital be equalized to the domestic cost of raising funds. Consequently, local credit spread shocks in the U.S. market would be globally transmitted across markets. However, if markets become less integrated during market, as is shown in this paper, asset prices and investors' decisions are not governed by a unique common SDF across markets. Moreover, there is ample documented evidence in failure of no arbitrage mechanism in these periods. As a result, this paper draw further doubts on the role of investment channel in contagion, consistent with the empirical evidence in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014) that confirms the "wake-up call" hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country-specific characteristics during the crisis. 
A Mean-Variance Optimization
Investors optimize the following utility subject to margin constraints. In equilibrium, market clears.
First order condition of the above optimization problem results in:
Where ψ i,t is agent i's shadow price of margin constraint and M i,t = (m
is a vector of dollar margins. Rearranging Eq (A), we have the portfolio choice of investor i:
Under the null hypothesis of market integration, a subgroup of investors cannot face higher margin requirements for a subgroup of assets, that is we have m j i,t = m i,t m j t . In equilibrium market clears. Aggregating asset demands for asset j over all investors, i, and rearrangement of Eq (14) we get the price of asset j:
Where 1 j is a J ×1 vector of zeros with one in column j,
the coefficient of risk aversion and the shadow price of margin constraint for the representative agent. Thus, the expected return of asset j follows:
Labeling global market return r G and expanding the covariance matrix, we have:
So, Eq (16) simplifies to
Aggregating Eq (18) by market portfolio weights, i.e. , and choosing
we obtain
Define the market risk premium
, and substitute Eq (19) into Eq (18), we have the international-margin CAPM:
Now if we assume assets-specific margins, m j are the same for all assets in market k and form beta neutral portfolio, then Eq (20) implies the expected return of this portfolio is related to the beta spread in that market, shadow price of funding constraint of representative agent and market specific margins. To form the BAB portfolio, r BAB , in each market k we long local low beta portfolio,r H , levered to beta one and short local high beta portfolio, r L , delevered to beta one.
B BAB Portfolio I follow Frazzini and Pedersen's methodology in estimating BAB portfolio. For this purpose, I compute beta of each asset by estimating volatilities and correlations separately:
Beta of asset j at each period is computed by the correlation of this asset and the global market portfolio, in the last five years, multiplied by the ratio of asset volatility to market volatility, in the last year. Since correlations appear to move more slowly than volatilities, a smaller window is assigned for volatility estimation. For volatility estimation, I use one-day log returns and use overlapping three-day log returns for correlation estimation to control for nonsynchronous trading. Moreover, at least 120 trading days of non-missing data is required to estimate volatilities. Similarly at least 750 trading days of non-missing return data is required for correlations estimation. After calculating the betas, they are shrunk toward the cross-sectional mean (i.e. 1) to reduce the influence of outliers: β j = 0.6β
To form the BAB portfolio, at each period, assets are ranked based on their ex-ante betas in ascending order and grouped in two categories (high-and low-beta) based on the median of the betas. In each portfolio, securities are weighted by the ranked betas (i.e., lower-beta securities have larger weights in the low-beta portfolio and higher-beta securities have larger weights in the high-beta portfolio). The portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month. BAB is then formed by longing the high beta portfolio, de-leveraged to beta one, and shorting the low beta portfolio, leveraged to a beta of one. This results in a zero beta portfolio, ex-ante. More formally if r t is the vector of monthly asset returns and β t we have:
1. r H,t+1 = r t+1 w H,t , and r L,t+1 = r t+1 w L,t .
2. β H,t+1 = β t+1 w H,t , and
C MCMC and Gibbs Sampler
In this paper, I implement Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Gibbs sampler to draw samples from the conditional distributions, following Jostova and Philipov (2005) and Ang and Chen (2007) , who implement a similar methodology to estimate conditional beta of a single-factor CAPM. Taking the averages of these samples, we obtain the expected value of the joint distribution of the unknown parameters. By Bayes law, posterior distributions are proportional to the prior distributions times the likelihood function. Here, I assume the joint prior distribution is the product of the independent priors of each unknown parameter, which are assumed normally distributed. Likelihood function is derived from the dynamics of the BAB returns and the shadow price of the funding constraints (see below). Then, I randomly draw 10,000 samples from the posteriors and take the average to estimate the mean of the parameters. The first 1,000 draws are excluded, since they are considered as the training set.
The unknown parameters are φ 0 , φ 1 , σ ψ , σ b . Since ψ t is a persistent variable, here I assume it follows a stationary AR(1) process with unconditional mean φ 0 and mean reversion speed 
Therefore, the likelihood function is: Table presents test results on the measure of market segmentation. Panel A reports the results on the statistical significance of the measure and the time trend in univariate and panel regressions. In the univariate regression, I study the average of the measure of market segmentation for developed and emerging markets separately. P-values are calculated with Newey-West standard errors. In the panel regression, I study the measures of market segmentation for all cross-section of markets in an unbalanced pooled panel, where standard errors are clustered through both time and cross-section. Sample size in time and crosssection is also reported. Panel B presents the result of a one-way t-test for the size of the measure of market segmentation for emerging markets relative to developed markets. Table presents test results on the measure of US market segmentation conditional on local funding liquidity in US. The proxies for funding liquidity in the US are the TED spread, the VIX index, the credit spread, funding liquidity of the local representative investor implied by the margin-CAPM (Ψ U S t ) and the broker dealer leverage. P-values are calculated with Newey-West standard errors. Table presents test results on the measure of market segmentation conditional on local funding liquidity in US, pooling All markets in an unbalanced panel regression. The proxies for funding liquidity in the US are the TED spread, the VIX index, the credit spread, funding liquidity of the local representative investor implied by the margin-CAPM (Ψ U S t ) and the broker dealer leverage. P-values are calculated with double clustered standard errors. Table presents test results on the measure of market segmentation conditional on local funding liquidity in US, for two cases of developed markets (Panel A) and emerging markets (Panel B). The proxies for funding liquidity in the US are the TED spread, the VIX index, the credit spread, funding liquidity of the local representative investor implied by the margin-CAPM (Ψ U S t ) and the broker dealer leverage. P-values are calculated with double clustered standard errors. 
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